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IM THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, as 
trustee of UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
FUND, a common trust fund, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
PRICEVIEW, LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership; PRICE K.M., a Utah 
limited partnership; FRANZ C. 
STANGL, III, individually and as 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate of ELIZABETH ANN STANGL; and 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 20, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 900302 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Seventh Judicial 
District Court. This Courtfs jurisdiction is based on Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
evidence concerning the parties1 intent in entering into the 
partnership agreement and loan transaction. 
Standard of Review; The appropriate standard of review is 
the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being 
given to the trial court's conclusion of law. Williams v. 
Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). When 
reviewing a finding based solely on written materials, the 
appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court 
to examine the evidence de novo. In re Infant Anonymous, 
760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
evidence concerning the illegality of the loan. 
Standard of Review; The appropriate standard of review is 
the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being 
given to the trial court's conclusion of law. Williams v. 
Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing interest on 
the judgment amounts to be compounded monthly when the notes did 
not explicitly call for compound interest. 
Standard of Review: The appropriate standard of review is 
the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being 
given to the trial court's conclusion of law. Williams v. 
Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
4. Whether the trial court erred in entering partially 
duplicative judgments against Stangl individually. 
Standard of Review: The appropriate standard of review is 
the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being 
given to the trial court's conclusion of law. Williams v. 
Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
5. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to recuse 
itself. 
Standard of Review; The appropriate standard of review is 
the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being 
given to the trial court's conclusion of law. Williams v. 
Miller. 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-12 (1981 & Supp. 1986), reproduced 
as Exhibit E in the Addendum hereto. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1992), reproduced as Exhibit F 
in the Addendum hereto. 
RELATED APPEAL 
Appellant earlier appealed from the trial court's Partial 
Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure which was 
certified as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. That appeal has been briefed. This appeal was 
consolidated with the earlier appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1988, the Utah State Retirement Fund ("the Fund") 
commenced this judicial foreclosure action against defendants. 
Included in the Fund's claims for relief were claims against 
Franz C. Stangl, III, and Elizabeth Ann Stangl (now deceased) on 
their guaranties, claims against Stangl and Price K.M. as general 
partners, respectively, of Price K.M. and Priceview, Ltd. The 
Fund sought other relief relating to the dissolution of 
Priceview, Ltd. such as an accounting and payment of partnership 
distributions. 
In August 1988, the trial court granted the Fundfs motion 
for the appointment of a receiver and sua sponte struck 
defendants1 tenth and eleventh defenses. See Order Granting 
Plaintifffs Motion for Appointment of Receiver and striking the 
Tenth and Eleventh Defenses of Defendants1 Answer, dated 
September 12, 1988 (Exhibit 8 to Addendum of Brief of Appellant 
dated March 28, 1991). 
On January 31, 1990, the trial court entered summary judg-
ment in favor of the Fund on the issue of the Fund's entitlement 
to foreclose and on the Stangls1 guaranties. See Partial Summary 
Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure dated January 31, 
1990 (Exhibit A to Addendum hereto). Reserved for trial was the 
issue whether any defendants would be liable for a deficiency 
judgment following the foreclosure sale of the property based on 
defendants1 impairment of collateral defense. 
Prior to the trial, defendants filed an Affidavit of Recusal 
and Certification of Counsel. The trial court entered a Finding 
Relative to Sufficiency of Affidavit of Recusal dated May 15, 
1990 (finding it to be insufficient), and certified the Affidavit 
to the Honorable Don V. Tibbs of the Sixth Judicial District for 
review. Judge Tibbs denied the request for recusal. See 
Exhibits 13 and 14 to Addendum of Brief of Appellant dated March 
28, 1991. 
A 
Trial to the court was held on January 30, 1991. The court 
thereafter issued a Memorandum Decision on Trial Matters dated 
March 1, 1991 (Exhibit D to Addendum hereto), entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (Exhibit C to Addendum hereto) and a 
Judgment dated June 13, 1991 (Exhibit B to Addendum hereto). 
Defendants thereafter timely filed their Notice of Appeal to 
this Court on July 12, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts underlying the dispute between the parties in this 
appeal are fully set forth in the Statement of Facts in the Brief 
of Appellant dated March 28, 1991. Since these appeals have been 
consolidated, defendants respectfully refer the Court to the 
Statement of Facts in the original Brief of Appellant. 
Additional procedural facts are set forth above, and criti-
cal testimony is set forth throughout the argument section of 
this Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The conduct of the parties reveals an ambiguity in the 
partnership agreement and loan transaction that does not exist on 
the face of the documents. Specifically, Stangl believed that 
the Fund intended to make an equity investment, not a loan, but 
that a "loan" was structured to provide valuable tax benefits to 
Stangl. Stangl did not intend to contribute $500,000 worth of 
property in exchange for a 20% partnership interest and sole 
personal liability on a $4,350,000 loan while the Fund 
contributed $100 for an 80% partnership interest and assumed no 
risk of loss. In addition, the Fund carried the transaction on 
its books as an equity, not as a loan, and not as a mixed 
equity/loan transaction. It was not until the shopping center 
suffered financial difficulties that the Fund considered the 
transaction a true loan. Thus, the court erred in not allowing 
or considering evidence of the parties1 true intent. Their 
conduct created an ambiguity which should have been explained 
through the introduction of extrinsic evidence. 
The Fund did not have the authority to make a loan to the 
partnership. Under Utah Code Ann. S 49-9-12(h) (1981), the Fund 
only had the authority to make loans secured by Federal Housing 
Administration or Veterans1 Administration insurance. According-
ly, the loan was ultra vires and void. The court's interpreting 
the transaction as a loan was in error because it denied giving 
the transaction a legal effect. 
The court erred in allowing the Summary Judgment and the 
Judgment to bear interest compounded monthly. The notes do not 
explicitly (or even implicitly) allow compounding. In fact, the 
notes only provide that when the principal balance is 
accelerated, any then accrued but unpaid interest will be added 
to the outstanding principal and that amount will then bear 
interest at 18% before and after judgment. Utah law does not 
allow the compounding of interest unless the agreement explicitly 
so provides. 
The court improperly entered duplicative judgments against 
Stangl. While Stangl may be subject to personal liability in 
different capacities, that is, as a general partner and as a 
guarantor, that does not mean he should have two judgments 
pending against him for the same liability. 
The court refused to recuse itself when requested to do so 
by Stangl before trial. At trial, however, the courtfs bias 
against Stangl and Stanglfs position was fully revealed. The 
trial court should have recused itself. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE 
OF THE PARTIES* INTENT IN ENTERING THE TRANSACTION. 
The trial court erred in ruling that the partnership 
agreement and loan documents were unambiguous as a matter of law 
and in refusing to allow parol evidence to show the parties1 true 
intent. Although the general rule is that a court will not allow 
parol evidence to vary the terms of a written agreement which 
appears to be unambiguous on its face, there are several 
exceptions to this rule. For example, parol evidence is allowed 
to explain the meaning of documents when: (1) both parties to the 
contract demonstrate a different meaning by their actions; and 
(2) a latent ambiguity exists. 
n 
A. The parties' conduct created an ambiguity because they both 
treated the transaction as an equity investment. 
The trial court erred in not allowing parol evidence to 
explain the ambiguity in the documents which was caused by the 
parties' conduct. The Utah Supreme Court in Bullfrog Marina, 
Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972), stated that if parties 
to a contract have demonstrated by their actions that an agree-
ment means something different from that stated in writing, the 
actions of the parties create an ambiguity and the intent of the 
parties should then be enforced. 
In Bullfrog, the parties entered into two separate 
agreements which provided for the leasing of houseboats. The 
agreements consisted of an employment agreement, by which the 
defendant became an employee of the plaintiff, and a lease, by 
which the defendant leased to the plaintiff three houseboats for 
two years. The purpose of the separate agreements and the 
structure of the transaction was to circumvent requirements of 
the National Park Service with respect to concessions. After 
about one year, the Park Service began inquiring into the 
operation and it appeared that the parties might not be able to 
continue the houseboat rental operation under the current system. 
The defendant then canceled the employment agreement pursuant to 
its terms and also canceled the lease and removed the three 
houseboats to another marina in order to continue his business. 
The plaintiff, however, brought this action asserting that the 
defendant did not have the right to remove the houseboats from 
the plaintifffs marina because the lease clearly provided that 
plaintiff was to have use of the houseboats for two years. This 
Court affirmed the trial court, which allowed the admission of 
parol evidence to explain the documents, because the parties had 
treated the transaction not as an employment situation and a 
lease, but as the defendant's operating a separate business. In 
so holding, this Court stated that 
when parties place their own construction on 
their agreement and so perform, the court may 
consider this as persuasive evidence of what 
their true intention was. It is true that 
the doctrine of practical construction may be 
applied only when the contract is ambiguous; 
but the question becomes ambiguous to whom? 
Where the parties have demonstrated by their 
actions and performance that to them the 
contract meant something quite different, the 
meaning and intent of the parties should be 
enforced. In such a situation, the parties 
by their actions have created the ambiguity 
to bring the rule into operation. If this 
were not the rule, the courts would be en-
forcing one contract when both parties had 
demonstrated that they meant and intended the 
contract to be quite different. 
Id. at 271 (emphasis added). 
In Bullough v. Sims. 400 P.2d 20 (Utah 1965), this Court 
also held that parties to an agreement can create an ambiguity by 
their actions. The parties in Bullough entered an agreement 
which unambiguously and clearly provided for a present sale of 
the plaintiffs1 interests in a partnership as of the date of the 
agreement and at the price which the partnership shares were then 
worth. The agreement further provided that until demand was made 
for payment, the partnership would pay the appropriate share of 
o 
profits to each of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs could not 
interfere with management of the partnership. After more than 
twenty years, the plaintiffs demanded payment for their partner-
ship shares at the present value, which had substantially 
increased. The defendant, however, tendered only the value of 
the shares as of the date of the agreement, relying on the 
language in the agreement. 
Over a period of many years, the parties evidenced their 
intention as to the meaning of the agreement that there had not 
been a sale at the time the agreement was entered, but that they 
contemplated operation as co-owners, and that the shares were to 
be sold at market value as of the date of sale. Although this 
directly conflicted with the clear language in the written 
agreement, the court allowed parol evidence to vary the terms of 
the written agreement because "the parties by their actions have 
created the •ambiguity1 required to bring the rule into opera-
tion." Id. at 23. The court further stated that 
[t]his rule of practical construction is 
predicated on the common sense concept that 
*actions speak louder than words.1. . . Thus, 
even if it be assumed that the words standing 
alone might mean one thing to the members of 
this court, where the parties have demon-
strated by their actions and performance that 
to them the contract meant something quite 
different, the meaning and intent of the 
parties should be enforced. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This Court also held in EIE v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 
P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981), that if the parties demonstrate by their 
actions a meaning different from that expressed in a written 
agreement, the intent of the parties should be enforced. In EIE, 
the parties entered an agreement under which the plaintiff would 
provide paramedic services for the defendant. The agreement 
clearly stated that the defendants would pay plaintiffs "the 
amount of $90.00 per call.11 Id. at 1192. Throughout the 
relationship, however, the parties construed the defendant's 
obligation to be payment of 90% of the total amount billed for 
paramedic services, not $90.00 per call as provided in the 
agreement. The $90.00-per-call figure came about because the 
parties originally thought that each call would be billed at 
$100.00, thus making the $90.00 equal to 90%. The plaintiff 
never objected to these payments until their relationship began 
to deteriorate. At that time, the plaintiff made demands upon 
the defendant for amounts allegedly due under the $90.00-per-call 
provision. 
Although noting the general rule that a complete and clear 
agreement which the parties have reduced to writing will not be 
varied by parol evidence, the court allowed parol evidence to 
show that the parties intended that the plaintiff was to receive 
only 90% of the total amount billed for paramedic services. The 
court stated that "[t]hough arguably clear on its face, where the 
parties demonstrate by their actions that to them the contract 
-i i 
meant something quite different, the intent of the parties will 
be enforced." Id. at 1195 (citing Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. 
Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972)). See also Concerning the 
Application for Water Rights of the Town of Estes Park v. 
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist.. 677 P.2d 320, 327 
(Colo. 1984) ("It is also well-established that the parties1 
construction of a contract before a dispute arises is a 
particularly persuasive aid in determining the true meaning of 
the agreement). 
In this case, although the loan documents appear to be 
unambiguous, the parties consistently treated the transaction as 
an equity investment. During the trial, Mr. Stangl proffered 
testimony that the parties1 intent was that the Fund would invest 
the $4,350,000 in the shopping center as an equity. The only 
purpose for structuring the agreement as a loan was to provide 
certain tax benefits to Mr. Stangl. Mr. Stangl testified by 
proffer1 his understanding of the partnership/loan transaction 
with the Fund: 
Q. [By Mr. Hunt] Okay. Now, with respect to the part-
nership agreement that was entered into between you and 
The Fund about the same time, Exhibit P-4, what did you 
contribute to that partnership? 
1
 Although the Court emphasized that it had earlier ruled that 
the partnership agreement and loan documents presented no ambi-
guity, the Court allowed a proffer of testimony and evidence. 
(Trial transcript of January 30, 1991 at 60-61). 
1 O 
A. The $500,000 worth of land and improvements. 
Q. And what did you do, give a deed to the partnership or 
something of that— 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was your understanding what The Fund—What did 
you get back for your contribution of that land? 
A. Twenty percent participation in the partnership. 
Q. Okay. Now, what did the Retirement Fund contribute to 
the partnership? 
A. $100 and a loan for $4,350,000. 
Q. And what was your understanding of what The Fund got for 
that contribution? 
A. Ownership of 80 percent of the shopping center and the 
property that the partnership owned. 
. . . 
Q. Now, I note as part of Exhibit D-9, there are—there's 
a— We have loan—basically some loan documents; a note, 
deed of trust, security instruments and personal guaranty. 
Given the fact that you created a partnership, why did you 
also have loan documents? Did you have any understanding of 
that? 
• • • 
A. There were several reasons. The first and most 
important one was a scorekeeping method for the Retirement 
1 O 
Fund to keep track of what their involvement with the 
shopping center was. They needed a conventional method of 
keeping score, so that they could keep track of what 
payments were made, if you will, of the preferential method 
of who got paid what out of the proceeds that were generated 
when the center was done. 
In addition to that, there were special tax benefits 
that the Retirement Fund was a non-taxable entity, and that 
they had no desire or ability to get the tax benefits that 
flowed from the shopping center. It was a significant part 
of the bargain, that I was to receive a hundred percent of 
those tax benefits. And the only way that I could receive a 
hundred percent of those tax benefits was to be at risk, 
which meant "sign a note." I signed a note in order to get 
those benefits. 
There were other reasons for the other documents that 
are involved here, but those were the two main purposes for 
the reason for the note and the reason for the partnership 
agreements, the way it was drawn. 
Q. With respect to those personal guaranties that you and 
your wife, Elizabeth—your late wife, Elizabeth, signed, did 
you understand that that exposed you to risk and you might 
be required to actually pay money under those guaranties? 
A. No. 
Q. Why was that? 
1 A 
A. I had a provision in the partnership agreement that 
allowed me, in the event that things went to hell in a 
handbasket, that the earth opened up and swallowed the 
shopping center, that I could distribute in kind to my 
partner, the shopping center and they would have a hundred 
percent of the shopping center and I would have nothing. I 
was willing to accept that risk. I was not willing to pay 
for one hundred percent of the debt of an empty shopping 
center to a partner, who's the lender, and get back nothing 
but paid receipts, and in the end have to give them 80 
percent ownership in the property that I had to pay for. It 
was never part of the bargain: it was never negotiated. It 
never entered my mind in any way that that was going to be 
required to do so. 
(Trial transcript of January 30, 1991 at 73-77 (emphasis added)). 
Moreover, Butch Johnson, the head investment officer at the 
Fund with whom Mr. Stangl dealt, testified that the Fund treated 
this transaction as an equity investment and even carried this 
transaction on its books as an equity. Mr. Johnson testified by 
proffer: 
Q. Okay. And if you know, how was the [1983] transaction 
communicated to [Attorney Brent] Stevenson? 
• • • 
[A.] Basically Mr. Stangl, myself, and Brent Stevenson sat 
down in my office, went through the provisions that had been 
1 R 
negotiated, and outlined a format that could accomplish all 
of the things that I've mentioned to convert this from a 
participating loan to a partnership with just a loan against 
the partnership. 
Q. Okay. And was that ultimately accomplished, that 
conversion? 
A. Yes. Mr. Stevenson prepared the documents and they were 
signed. 
Q. Subsequently to that point, Mr. Johnson, if you know, 
how did the—how did the State Retirement Fund carry the 
Creekview property on their books? Was it treated as a loan 
or equity or both or do you know? 
A. It was treated as an equity. 
(Trial transcript of January 30, 1991 (emphasis added)). 
William Chipman, Butch Johnson's successor at the Fund, was 
also questioned at trial about the Fund's characterization of the 
transaction between the parties. The court sustained an 
objection to the question, stating: 
Objection sustained. I do that on the ground what his 
category or even what The Fund's category of treatment 
as far as their internal operation is concerned does 
not change the legal obligations on the parties as 
reflected by the documents they executed. You could 
call it anything you want and it still wouldn't change 
the legal obligation. So that's the reason that the 
Court is sustaining the objection. 
Trial transcript of January 31, 1991 at 236-37. 
i a 
Based on the foregoing authorities, the courtfs ruling on 
the objection was plain error. 
Mr. Chipman testified at his deposition, however: 
Q. . . . How were these participating loans carried on the 
books of the Utah State Retirement Fund? How were they 
booked? 
A. I think it was all in a general ledger, real estate. I 
think each transaction had a number that was assigned to it. 
A property number. And my recollection is all the so-called 
participate or convertible — they1re all structured a 
little differently. No two are exactly alike. Had a number 
sequence that was different from the all cash purchases. 
But they were all shown under the same accounting data. We 
did have some subsidiary ledgers or subsidiary breakout 
where we showed the participating mortgages separate from 
the all cash purchases. 
. . . 
Q. Do you recall how the annual audit reports reflected 
these assets? Were they separately broken out? Real estate 
equities and real estate loans or was it just real estate 
assets and a number out to the side? 
A. Well, I think in the — main report, the annual report, 
the auditors prepare just real estate, one category. We 
might have had a different report, a subsidiary ledger we 
prepared on a separate page that broke it out into land, 
office buildings, shopping centers, industrial properties. 
Q. I see. 
A. And there may even have been a participating mortgage 
section. And it varied from year to year how that was 
represented. 
. . . 
Q. You heard Mr. Johnson testify that he considered these 
participating mortgages to be equities because the Fund had 
greater than 50 percent position. Did you share that 
conclusion? 
A. Yes, I think I shared that with — with him. 
(Deposition of William Chipman (February 21, 1989) at 21-24.) 
Because the parties1 actions have demonstrated an intent 
different from that expressed in the written agreements, their 
actions have created an ambiguity. Accordingly, the trial court 
erred by not allowing parol evidence as to the parties1 true 
intent. 
B. Parol evidence should be admitted when there is a latent 
ambiguity. 
The trial court erred in not allowing parol evidence to show 
the parties1 intent because a latent ambiguity exists. When a 
latent ambiguity exists, the trial court should allow extrinsic 
evidence to resolve any ambiguity. Hamada v. Valley National 
Bank, 555 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). In Hamada, a 
third party obtained a series of loans from the plaintiff for 
approximately $45,000, for which the third party pledged stock to 
secure the loan. Because the stock was in an obscure and small 
company, the plaintiff required the defendant, who was a partner 
of the third party, to agree to purchase the stock at a set price 
upon demand by the plaintiff as security for the loan. The 
agreement clearly provided for a purchase of the shares upon 
demand at a set price. After the third party defaulted on the 
loan, the plaintiff demanded that the defendant purchase the 
stock as required by the agreement. The court found that the 
extrinsic evidence raised a question of whether the agreement was 
intended by the parties to be an unconditional agreement to 
purchase the stock or whether it was a guarantee. If the agree-
ment were a guarantee, then it would not have been enforceable 
since subsequent loans were made. The court stated that 
[a] latent ambiguity is one where the lan-
guage employed is clear and intelligible and 
suggests but a single meaning, but some ex-
trinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a 
necessity for an interpretation or a choice 
among two or more possible meanings. Since 
the detection of the latent ambiguity re-
quires a consideration of facts outside the 
instrument itself, extrinsic evidence is 
obviously admissible to prove the existence 
of the ambiguity, as well as to resolve any 
ambiguity proven to exist. 
Id. at 1123. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals in Rodway v. Arrow Light Truck 
Parts. Inc., 772 P.2d 1349 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), similarly held 
that extrinsic evidence should be allowed to show that there are 
latent ambiguities. The defendant and the third party defendant 
in Rodway entered into an agreement to indemnify the defendant 
from any personal liability "due to his status or activity as an 
officer, director or shareholder of Arrow Light Truck Parts, 
Inc." Id. at 1351. In return for the indemnification agreement, 
the defendant sold his stock in Arrow to the third party defen-
dant for a very reduced price. The plaintiff subsequently 
brought an action for damages pursuant to a lease which the 
defendant signed prior to becoming an officer of Arrow, but after 
the date of formation of the corporation. The defendant asserted 
that the indemnification agreement protected him from liability 
based on the breach of this lease because the clear intent of the 
parties was to indemnify him from any liability in relation to 
his association with Arrow. 
The court stated that 
[i]n this case, the plain meaning of the term 
•officer1 and fdirector1 could be interpreted 
to exclude activities undertaken before [the 
defendant's] formal election, but the appli-
cation of the indemnity clause to [the defen-
dant's] act of signing the lease creates a 
latent or extrinsic ambiguity as to whether 
the indemnity clause covers agreements signed 
in furtherance of the existing corporation by 
persons about to become officers and direc-
tors of that corporation. 
Id. at 1351-52. Noting that a contract with unambiguous terms is 
generally construed according to the plain meaning of those 
terms, the court further stated that "extrinsic evidence may be 
used to show that there are latent ambiguities." Id. at 1351. 
See also Pistone v. Superior Court. 279 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177 
(1991) ("no matter how clear and unambiguous a writing is on its 
face, the rule allows admitting evidence to resolve a latent 
ambiguity"). 
In the present case, a latent ambiguity exists in the combi-
nation of the partnership agreement and the loan documents and 
the substantial difference in capital contributions and percent-
ages of ownership. Under the Fund's argument, when the parties 
entered the partnership agreement, Mr. Stangl contributed the 
real property, which contribution the partners valued at 
$500,000, and received a 20% interest in the partnership. The 
Fund made a contribution of the loan of $4,350,000, which the 
partners valued at $100, and received an 80% interest in the 
partnership. As Mr. Stangl testified at trial, it simply did not 
make sense that he would contribute $500,000 to a partnership for 
a 20% interest, and assume personal responsibility for a 
$4,350,000 loan. At the same time, the Fund contributed $100 for 
an 80% interest in the partnership and assumed no risk with 
respect to the loan. This construction of the agreements would 
produce an absurd result. See Cashio v. Shoriakr 481 So. 2d 
1013, 1016 (La. 1986) ("If a literal interpretation will lead to 
absurd consequences, then the court can go beyond the forced 
meaning and consider all pertinent facts."). If Mr. Stangl 
wanted to enter into a simple "loan" arrangement, he could have 
done so without giving away property worth $500,000. At the very 
least, this creates a latent ambiguity as to the meaning of the 
documents. Accordingly, the lower court should have allowed 
extrinsic evidence in order to explain the parties1 true intent. 
The trial court erred by refusing to consider extrinsic 
evidence in determining the intent of the parties because the 
parties1 actions created an ambiguity. Up until the time the 
partnership began to lose money, both parties treated the trans-
action as an equity investment. Only when the Fund realized that 
its investment was not going to be fruitful did it assert that 
this transaction was only a loan. (Testimony of Stangl, Trial 
Transcript of January 30, 1991, at 88.) 
There is evidence that the parties intended the loans 
themselves to be the capital contribution of the Fund. The Fund 
contends that its capital contribution was valued at $100 and was 
its willingness to make the loans. Stangl obviously believed 
differently as set forth in his testimony quoted in Point I.A. 
Even William Chipman, however, testified as follows: 
Q. [by Mr. Marshall] My question is: Did the Retirement 
Fund and the limited partnership—excuse me. Strike that. 
Did the Retirement Fund and Price K.M. ever enter into an 
agreement in writing for an additional contribution from the 
Retirement Fund? 
A. Yes. There was a second letter of financing that was 
additional capital. 
Q. I'm talking about not the second loan in 1985; I'm 
talking about additional capital contribution in the 
partnership over the one hundred— 
MR. HUNT: Well, objection. Counsel is testifying, 
your honor. 
THE COURT: Well, the objection is overruled. 
Obviously, the witness is confusing loan funds with capital 
contribution. So that needs to be clarified for him. 
Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991 at 232-33. 
Chipman obviously viewed the loan proceeds as a capital 
contribution which supports Stangl's contention that the loan was 
treated by both Stangl and the Fund as an equity investment and 
not as a loan. 
Because of this latent ambiguity, the court was in error in 
refusing to consider extrinsic evidence. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TESTIMONY 
REGARDING THE LEGALITY OF THE LOAN AGREEMENT. 
The trial court erred in not allowing testimony on whether 
the loan agreement constituted an ultra vires act because the 
appellants had a right to defend against the appellee's claims on 
the grounds that the appellee's actions were ultra vires. The 
doctrine of ultra vires provides that any action beyond the scope 
of an entity's authority is null and void. Weese v. Davis County 
CommVn, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992). In Weese, this Court considered 
whether a contract existed between Davis County and its employees 
with respect to merit increases in pay for following years. This 
Court held that because Article XIV, section 3, of the Utah 
Constitution prohibited a governmental entity from creating or 
incurring any debt in excess of tax revenues for the current 
year, the county commission could not bind itself for debts 
incurred in subsequent years. Because the contract at issue 
consisted of incurring debt in future years, the county did not 
have the right to enter the agreement. In holding the contract 
to be null and void, the Court stated that "[a]ny act by the 
county in excess of this authority or forbidden by the Utah 
Constitution is null and void as an ultra vires act." Id. at 3. 
In First Equity Corp. v. Utah State Univ., 544 P.2d 887 
(Utah 1975) , this Court also stated that a state institution is 
subject to the control of the legislature and the laws of this 
state and that lfa power not granted is a power prohibited." Id. 
at 891. In First Equity, the plaintiff brought an action against 
Utah State University to collect commissions on the purchase of 
common stock. Although the legislature granted Utah State 
University the authority to handle its financial affairs, the 
Court found that this grant of authority did not include the 
authority to invest in common stock. Consequently, the contract 
between the plaintiff and Utah State University was an ultra 
vires act and was declared by the court to be null and void. The 
Court stated that ,f,[w]here a statute confers certain specific 
powers, those not enumerated are withheld. In other words. 
enumeration of powers operates to exclude such as are not enumer-
ated. '" Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Van Eaton v. Town of 
Sydney. 231 N.W. 475, 477 (Iowa 1930)). 
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-12(h) (1981) provided 
that the Fund could invest only in real estate mortgages which 
were secured by the Federal Housing Administration or Veterans 
Administration insurance or guaranteed by a corporation approved 
by the state commissioner of insurance. Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-
12(h) (1981) (repealed in 1987). Although in 1983 the legisla-
ture amended section 49-9-12 to allow the Fund to make any 
investment in which a prudent man dealing with the property of 
another would invest, this amendment was not effective at the 
time the 1983 transaction occurred. It, therefore, cannot 
apply.2 Furthermore, even if it were to apply, the specific 
enumeration of authority to invest in certain types of real 
estate loans would preclude the Fund from investing in all other 
types. Where there is both a general provision and a specific 
provision, the specific provision will govern. See Pan Energy v. 
Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1991). Thus, the 1985 loan is 
not saved by the 1983 amendment to section 49-9-12. 
The Fundfs ratification argument is really an argument for 
retroactive application of a statute. Unless a statute is 
expressly stated to apply retroactively, it can only be applied 
prospectively. Washington National Insurance Co. v. Sherwood 
Associates, 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
There is no other statute or grant of authority to the Fund 
which would have allowed it to invest in any other real estate 
mortgages. The legislatures enumeration of certain types of 
real estate loans in which the Fund could invest, operated to 
specifically exclude the authority to invest in any other types 
of loans. The "loan" to the partnership in this case was not 
secured by FHA or VA insurance and was not guaranteed by a 
corporation approved by the state commissioner of insurance. Any 
act by the Fund to make a "loan" of this type would be an ultra 
vires act and null and void. 
In addition, the doctrine of estoppel cannot give legal 
effect to an ultra vires act. In Town of Gila Bend v. Walled 
Lake Door Co., 490 P.2d 551 (Ariz. 1971), the Arizona Supreme 
Court stated that the doctrine of estoppel could not prevent a 
person from asserting the defense of ultra vires. Although the 
act complained of in Town of Gila was not ultra vires, the court 
stated that 
[i]n a proper case, the principles of waiver and estop-
pel cannot be applied to circumvent stated legislative 
intent and policy, nor can a contract which violates [a 
statute] and is, therefore, void ab initio be ratified 
or approved in any manner by defendant or its officers 
or any other persons so as to create an enforceable 
liability. 
Id. at 558 (emphasis in original). 
In the present case, the legislature expressed a clear 
intent that it did not want the Fund to invest in real estate 
loans that were not secured by Federal Housing Administration or 
Veterans Administration insurance or guaranteed by a corporation 
approved by the State Commissioner of Insurance to guarantee 
loans. Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-12(h) (1981). Although the trial 
court may have disagreed with the reasons behind the legisla-
ture^ actions, the court cannot replace the legislatures 
judgment with its own. Private individuals and state agencies 
also cannot circumvent legislative dictates. By not allowing the 
appellants to introduce evidence on their ultra vires defense 
because they accepted the benefits of the contract, the trial 
court allowed the Fund to accomplish indirectly what it could not 
do directly. The trial court enforced an illegal contract. 
Moreover, because the Fund did not have the legal authority 
to make the kind of loan that was made in this case, construing 
the transaction as a loan denied giving legal effect to the 
transaction. MThis court has long adhered to the principle that 
in construing a contract, the construction giving an instrument a 
legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted where 
reasonable, and between two possible constructions that will be 
adopted which establishes a valid contract." Stanal v. Todd. 554 
P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (Utah 1976). See also Frailev v. McGarry. 211 
P.2d 840, 847 (Utah 1949) (if contract can be declared lawful by 
any reasonable construction, it is court's duty to so interpret 
it). The trial court erred by not allowing extrinsic evidence on 
whether the documents constituted a "loan," or as Stangl con-
tends, an equity investment. This construction effectively gave 
the documents no legal effect. To give the documents legal 
effect, the trial court should have allowed extrinsic evidence to 
show the parties1 true intent and should have construed the 
documents as providing for an equity investment. This was 
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-12(m) (1981) (repealed in 
1987) and is in accordance with the actions of both parties. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING COMPOUND INTEREST. 
The trial court erred by allowing compound interest because 
the loan agreements did not explicitly provide for compound 
interest. In Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 
643 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court did not allow compound 
interest because "the parties [did not] expressly agree[] to 
compound interest . . . .w Id. at 647 (emphasis added). In 
Mountain States, the interest provision stated that "•[t]his Note 
shall bear interest upon the unpaid principal balance hereof from 
the date hereof until paid, at a rate of ten percent (10%) per 
annum. Should interest not be paid when due, it shall thereafter 
bear like interest as the principal.111 Id. (quoting loan provi-
sion) . As noted by the court, this provision only provided that 
unpaid interest would bear interest the same as the principal. 
There was no provision which explicitly provided that interest 
should be compounded monthly and the court, therefore, did not 
allow it. The court based its holding on the fact that lf[i]n 
Utah, compound interest is not favored by the law.11 Id. 
In the present case, the interest provisions in the loan 
agreements also do not expressly provide for interest to be 
compounded monthly. The provisions state that lf[i]n the event 
the holder hereof exercises its right to accelerate hereunder, 
the entire unpaid principal balance, together with all accrued 
but unpaid interest, shall thereafter, until paid, and both 
before and after judgment, earn interest at the rate of eighteen 
percent (18%) per annum." There is nothing in this provision 
which expressly provides for interest to be compounded monthly. 
All that the provision allows is that upon acceleration, accrued 
but unpaid interest will be added to the principal and both will 
earn simple interest at the specified rate. Because the interest 
provision did not explicitly provide for interest to be compound-
ed monthly, the trial court erred in awarding compound interest. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING DUPLICATIVE JUDGMENTS. 
The Partial Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Fore-
closure included judgment against Franz C. Stangl, III, individu-
ally and as personal representative of the Estate of Elizabeth 
Ann Stangl, on Plaintiffs Third Claim for Relief for the amounts 
of $5,052,383.47 and $247,302.38. These amounts were to bear 
interest at the rate of 18% per annum, compounded monthly, until 
paid. In addition, the Fund was awarded interest on the combined 
total late charges in the amount of $2,202.50 at the rate of 12% 
per annum until paid. See Partial Summary Judgment and Order and 
Decree of Foreclosure, Exhibit A to the Addendum hereto, at 5 3 
(hereinafter "Summary Judgment"). 
The Summary Judgment further provided that any amounts 
recovered by the Fund through the foreclosure sale of the subject 
property would be credited against the judgment against Stangl, 
individually and in his capacity as personal representative of 
Elizabeth Ann Stangl's estate. See id. at 5 5. 
Following the entry of the Summary Judgment, the subject 
property was sold for $3,500,000. Post trial, the lower court 
awarded the Fund a deficiency judgment against Priceview, Ltd., 
Franz C. Stangl, III, and Price K.M. in the amounts of (1) 
$2,481,314.16, with interest accruing on $2,479,260.90 at the 
rate of 18% per annum from April 1, 1991, compounded monthly, and 
interest accruing on $1,683.00 at the rate of 12% per annum from 
April 1, 1991, and (2) $342,265.96 with interest accruing on 
$340,063.46 at the rate of 18% per annum from April 1, 1991, 
compounded monthly, and interest accruing on $2,202.50 at the 
rate of 12% per annum from January 31, 1990. See Judgment, 
Exhibit B to Addendum hereto, at If 1, 2. 
The Judgment also provided that the liability of Stangl, 
Priceview and Price K.M. was joint and several with the liability 
of Stangl under the Summary Judgment. "Satisfaction of one such 
liability shall constitute satisfaction of the other." Id. at f 
3. Despite the foregoing language providing that satisfaction of 
the Judgment constituted satisfaction of the Summary Judgment and 
on 
vice versa, two judgments for the same liability were entered 
against Stangl. The Summary Judgment was entered against Stangl 
as a guarantor and the Judgment was entered against him as a 
general partner of Price K.M., the general partner of Priceview. 
Nevertheless, the Fund is entitled to only one recovery and it 
was improper for the Court to enter duplicative judgments against 
Stangl individually given the posture of this case. The harm to 
Stangl is that two judgments exist against him for the same 
liability, albeit in his different capacities as guarantor and 
general partner. 
It was improper for the court to enter the summary judgment 
against Stangl as part of the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1992) provides: 
There can be one action for the recovery of any 
debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by 
mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judg-
ment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with 
costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged 
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount 
and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to pro-
ceed and sell the same according to the provisions of 
law relating to sales on execution, and a special 
execution or order of sale shall be issued for that 
purpose. 
(Emphasis added). Section 78-37-2 goes on to provide that 
[i]f it appears from the return of the officer 
making the sale that the proceeds are insufficient and 
a balance still remains due, judgment therefor must 
then be docketed by the clerk and execution may be 
issued for such balance as in other cases; but no 
general execution shall issue until after the sale of 
the mortgaged property and the application of the 
amount realized as aforesaid. 
While it is true that section 78-37-1 does not by its terms 
apply to guaranties, the Fund chose to combine a cause of action 
on the guaranty of Stangl and his late wife with its judicial 
mortgage foreclosure action. It was procedurally incorrect for 
the court to add a personal judgment against Stangl in the 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure because section 78-37-1 only 
allows the court to enter a judgment "adjudging the amount due" 
and ordering the sale of the property. The court should have 
waited until after the subject property was sold at sherifffs 
sale to enter a deficiency judgment against Priceview, Price K.M. 
and Stangl, and a judgment on the guaranty against Stangl. 
Accordingly, the Summary Judgment should be satisfied, but under 
no circumstances should there exist two judgments against Stangl 
(in whatever capacity) for the same liability. 
V. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECUSE 
ITSELF IS EVIDENT FROM THE COURT'6 BIAS 
AGAINST STANGL EXHIBITED AT TRIAL 
In the original Brief of Appellant filed March 28, 1991, 
Appellants fully brief the recusal issue. The Fund complained in 
its responsive brief, however, that the issue was not properly 
before this Court. Appellants therefore incorporate its earlier 
arguments here. 
At trial the lower court exhibited a bias against Stangl 
that went beyond ruling in the Fundfs favor. Particularly during 
Stangl1s cross-examination of William Chipman as the Fundfs 
rebuttal witness, the court displayed inconsistent rulings and an 
undue irritation with Stangl and his legal theories. Stangl was 
effectively prevented from cross-examining Mr. Chipman. 
Chipmanfs cross-examination was as follows: 
Q. [By Mr. Hunt] Mr. Chipman, calling your attention to 
Paragraph 4.03 of the partnership agreement, Exhibit P-4, as 
I read the first sentence in that paragraph, it says that 
the—"As its initial and only required contribution to the 
capital of the partnership, the limited partner shall make a 
loan to the partnership in the principal sum of up to 
$4,350,000 in accordance with the terms, conditions, and 
provisions set forth in the promissory note and the 
subsequent disbursement agreement attached hereto as 
Exhibits B and C, respectively, and which loan shall be 
secured by a first and prior trust deed lien upon the 
property and all improvements thereon and such other 
collateral related to the property as the limited partner 
may require." 
Is that your understanding of the capital contribution 
of The Fund to the partnership? 
MR. MARSHALL: I object to that. What he understands 
is not relevant. 
THE COURT: Yes. I think it speaks for itself, Coun-
sel. I donft know what he can answer. So the objection is 
sustained. 
MR. HUNT: Well, your Honor, Counsel has just been 
asking him question after question relating to this 
document. 
THE COURT: But he was asking him questions whether it 
was altered by other written means. He was asked: "Was 
there a written statement?" And he said: "No." That's all 
he asked him there. He didn't ask him to interpret the 
provisions of it. 
Q. (By Mr. Hunt) To your knowledge, did The Fund make its 
capital contribution to this partnership? 
A. Which capital contribution are you referring to?3 
Q. The ones stated in Paragraph 4.03. 
MR. MARSHALL: Well, I have to object to that question 
because— 
MR. HUNT: It's a question of fact, your Honor. I'm 
asking if they made the capital— 
MR. MARSHALL: I object. It's not an issue in this 
case that's ever been raised before. 
3
 As set forth in Point I.B. above, this question was 
significant. Chipman had testified on direct examination as a 
rebuttal witness that "[t]here was a second letter of financing 
that was additional capital." (Trial Transcript of January 30, 
1991, at 233) . The court noted that the witness was "confusing loan 
funds with capital contribution." Id. That is exactly the point. 
Stangl maintains that the parties considered the loan funds to be 
an equity investment with the risk of loss to be borne by both 
parties. Hence, the provision in the partnership agreement 
allowing Stangl's distribution in kind of partnership assets to the 
limited partner if "things went to hell in a handbasket." 
(Testimony of Stangl, Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991, at 77) . 
THE COURT: It's really not an issue. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, they did. Thev loaned them the 
money. They paid the $100. At least nobody has ever denied 
it. 
Q. (By Mr. Hunt) The $100 was the agreed value? 
THE COURT: Well, whatever it says. Anyway, the loan 
was made so— Go ahead. Put your next question. 
Q. (By Mr. Hunt) Mr. Chipman, you agree with Mr. Johnson 
that this property was treated as an equity by The Fund; 
isn't that correct? 
MR. MARSHALL: Well, I object again. Irrelevant and 
immaterial. Parol evidence. 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. I do that on the 
ground what his category or even what the Fund's category of 
treatment as far as their internal operation is concerned 
does not change the legal obligations on the parties as 
reflected by the documents they executed. You could call it 
anything you want and it still wouldn't change the legal 
obligation. So that's the reason that the Court is sustain-
ing the objection. 
Q. (By Mr. Hunt) Mr. Chipman, you agree that The Fund 
periodically—in fact, The Fund had a policy that it would 
from time to time actually sell the property or sell one of 
its equities at an amount that constituted a loss to The 
Fund, if that was considered in the long-term best interest 
of the Fund; isn't that correct? 
MR. MARSHALL: Objection, irrelevant and immaterial. 
THE COURT: Yes. That's irrelevant, Counsel, what they 
would do on another transaction. I can't see where that's 
material. So objection is sustained. 
MR. HUNT: I have no further questions, your Honor. 
(Trial transcript of January 30, 1991 at 234-37 (emphasis 
added)). 
As set forth in Point I of this brief, the parties' conduct 
with respect to the loan transaction was indeed relevant and 
established an ambiguity in the transaction. The court not only 
erred in refusing to hear or consider testimony concerning the 
way the Fund characterized the loan, the court displayed an undue 
intolerance of Stangl and his position. Harboring such strong 
feelings and an apparent inability to impartially consider 
Stangl's case, the court should have recused itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments contained in this Brief, the original 
Brief of Appellant and Reply Brief of Appellant filed March 28, 
1991, and June 17, 1991, respectively, Defendants respectfully 
request this Court to reverse and remand with the following 
instructions to the trial court: (1) allow and consider evidence 
of the parties' intent in entering the partnership agreement and 
loan documents; (2) allow and consider evidence and law 
concerning the legality of the loan; (3) change the interest on 
any judgment to simple interest; (4) order the entry of a 
satisfaction of the summary judgment so that there are not 
duplicate judgments against Stangl; and (5) order Judge Bunnell 
to recuse himself from further trial or pre-trial proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 0 day of October, 1992. 
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a Utah limited ) 
; FRANZ C. ) 
; ELIZABETH ANN ) 
JOHN DOES 1 ) 
Defendants. ) 
Civil No. 15620 
The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision on 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated October 19, 
1989, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows 
1. Defendant Priceview Ltd. owes the following 
amounts to plaintiff on the First Claim for Relief of 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint: 
EXHIBIT NO. A 
Principal $4,204,112.64 
Interest through 6/1/89 971,442.58 
Late Charges 1,683.00 
Interest on late charges through 
11/10/89 145.25 
Less payment from Receiver (125,000.00) 
TOTAL $5,052,383.47 
Interest shall accrue on the total amount of $5,052,383.47 at 
the rate of eighteen (18) percent per annum from June 1, 1989, 
compounded monthly, until paid in full. 
2. Defendant Priceview Ltd. owes the following 
amounts to plaintiff on the Second Claim for Relief of 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint: 
Principal $159,883.23 
Interest through 6/1/89 85,216.65 
Late Charges 2,027.52 
Interest on late charges 
through 11/10/89 174.98 
TOTAL $247,302.38 
Interest shall accrue on the total combined amount of principal 
and accrued interest in the amount of $245,099.88 at the rate 
of eighteen (18) percent per annum from June 1, 1989, 
compounded monthly, until paid in full. Interest shall accrue 
on the combined total of late charges and accrued interest 
thereon in the amount of $2,202.50 at the rate of twelve (12) 
percent per annum, simple interest, from the date of this 
Judgment until paid in full. 
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3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant 
Franz C. Stangl, III, individually and as personal 
representative of the Estate of Elizabeth Ann Stangl, on the 
Third Claim for Relief of the Amended Complaint, which shall be 
joint and several with the judgment against Priceview Ltd., for 
the following amounts: 
A. On the First Note dated February 28, 1983: 
Principal $4,204,112.64 
Interest through 6/1/89 971,442.58 
Late Charges 1,683.00 
Interest on late charges through 
11/10/89 145.25 
Less payment from Receiver (125,000.00) 
TOTAL $5,052,383.47 
Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the total judgment amount 
of $5,052,383.47 at the rate of eighteen (18) percent per annum 
from June 1, 1989, compounded monthly, until paid in full. 
B. On the Second Note dated March 12, 1985: 
Principal $159,883.23 
Interest through 6/1/89 85,216.65 
Late Charges 2,027.52 
Interest on late charges 
through 11/10/89 174.98 
TOTAL $247,302.38 
Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the total combined amount 
of principal and accrued interest in the amount of $245,099.88 
at the rate of eighteen (18) percent per annum from June 1, 
1989, compounded monthly, until paid in full. Plaintiff is 
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further entitled to interest on the combined total of .late 
charges and accrued interest thereon in the amount of $2,202,50 
at the rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from the date of 
this Judgment until paid in full. 
4. Determination of the amount of plaintiff's 
reasonable attorneys' fees is reserved and shall be determined 
at an evidentiary hearing at which plaintiff shall have the 
burden of establishing the amount of its reasonable attorneys' 
fees. 
5. Any amounts received by plaintiff through the 
foreclosure sale of the subject real property shall be credited 
toward the Judgment against Fran:: C. Stangl, III, individually 
and as personal representative of the Estate of Elizabeth Ann 
Stangl. 
6. The property described in the First Deed of Trust 
dated February 28, 1983, and Second Deed of Trust dated March 
12, 1985, and hereinafter more particularly described, or such 
portions thereof as may be sufficient to pay the amounts found 
to be due and owing under this Judgment, and the accruing costs 
herein, and expenses of sale, shall be sold at public auction 
by the sheriff of Carbon County, State of Utah, in the manner 
prescribed by law for such sales. The Sheriff, out of the 
proceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, 
disbursements, and commissions, and then shall pay to 
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plaintiff, or to its attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs 
of this action, then such sums for plaintiff's attorneys' fees, 
then the amount owing to plaintiff for principal, interest, 
costs, and expenses, or so much of such sums as such proceeds 
will pay, and the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for and 
paid over the the Clerk of this Court subject to this Court's 
further order. 
7. All persons having an interest in the subject 
premises shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory 
proof of interest, to redeem the same within the time provided 
by law for such redemption. From and after the expiration of 
the period of redemption, as provided by law, all defendants 
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through, or 
under them, and any other person or entity shall be forever 
barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest, and estate 
in and to the subject premises and from and after the delivery 
of the Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises the grantee named 
therein shall be given possession thereof. 
8. The issue whether any of defendants shall be 
liable for any deficiency judgment following the foreclosure 
sale of the subject property is reserved pending trial of the 
issue whether or not plaintiff's actions impaired the value of 
the subject property sufficiently to relieve defendants from 
responsibility for payment of a deficiency judgment. 
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9. The subject real property described in the First 
and Second Deeds of Trust is located in Carbon County, State of 
Utah, and is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point on the South line of a 
highway right-of-way and the West line of a 
street, said point being North 827.95 feet and 
West 1677.63 feet from the Northeast corner of 
Sunset View Subdivision, said Northeast corner of 
Sunset View Subdivision said to be South 945,23 
feet and West 339.30 feet from the Northeast 
corner of Section 20, Township 14 South, Range 10 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, running thence 
South 89°26,13" West 502.17 feet along the South 
line of said highway; thence South 9°38'59fr East 
446.94 feet; thence Southeasterly 510.12 feet 
along the arc of a 636.197 foot radius curve to 
the left (long chord bears South 32°37f14M East 
496.57 feet); thence South 55°35'29" East 91.37 
feet; thence North 14°48f42M West 61.24 feet; 
thence North 55035f29" West 45.00 feet; thence 
Northwesterly 5.00 feet along the arc of a 
596.197 foot radius curve to the right (long 
chord bears North 55°21,05M West 5.00 feet); 
thence East 444.13 feet; thence North 429.092 
feet; thence Northwesterly 533.19 feet along the 
arc of a 413 foot radius curve to the right (long 
chord bears North 37°34,27M West 496.925 feet); 
thence North 0°35,21M West 5.02 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to its post-judgment costs 
and a reasonable attorneys' fee, as shall be shown by affidavit 
of plaintiff or its counsel. 
11. Defendant Priceview Ltd. was terminated and 
dissolved June 7, 1988. 
sr 
DATED t h i s _ ? / "day of t^&YiUAvt-l , 1990 
BY THE COJJ^ J: 
L?*??£*; 
Boyd Burmeli 
( .District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Partial Summary Judgment to be hand 
delivered this day of January, 1990, to the following: 
George A. Hunt 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 





JU:I 13 issi 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATS RETIREMENT BOARD, 
as trustees of UTAH STATE 




PRICEVTEW LTD. , a Utah 
limited partnership; 
PRICE K. M. , a Utah limited 
partnership; FRANZ C. 
STANGL, III; ELIZABETH ANN 
STANGL; and JOHN DOES 1 
through 20, 
Defendants. 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in the above-captioned action, and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board is awarded judgment 
against defendants Priceview Ltd., Price K. M. , and Franz C. 
Stangl, III, jointly and severally, as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant 
Priceview Ltd.: 
EXHIBIT NO. _ £ 
'' n:?ury ^ 
JUDGMENT 
C i v i l NO. 15620 
(a) On the First Claim for Relief of plaintiff s 
Amended Complaint for the following amounts: 
Principal $4, 204, 112, 64 
Interest through 4/1/91 2,163,548.26 
Late charges 1, 683.00 
Interest on late charges 
through 4/1/91 370.26 
Less payments from 
Receiver: 
10-24-89 (125,000.00) 
1-22-90 (60, 000.00) 
3-12-90 (203,400.00) (388,400.00) 
Less proceeds of Sheriff s 
sale f3,59Q,9Q.Q9i 
TOTAL $2, 481, 314. 16 
Interest shall accrue on the total amount of 
$2,479,260.90 at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) 
per annum from April 1, 1991, compounded monthly, 
until paid in full. Interest shall accrue on the late 
charge in the amount of $1,683.00 at the rate of 
twelve percent (12%) per annum, simple interest, from 
April 1, 1991, until paid in full. 
(b) On the Second Claim for Relief of 





Interest through 4/1/91 180,180.23 
Late charges 2,027.52 
Interest on late charges 
as per Judgment 
of 1-31-90 174r 99 
TOTAL $342,265.96 
Interest shall accrue on the total combined 
amount of principal and accrued interest in the amount 
of $340,063.46 at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) 
per annum from April 1, 1991, compounded monthly, 
until paid in full. Interest shall accrue on the 
combined total of late charges and accrued interest 
thereon in the amount of $2, 202. 50 at the rate of 
twelve percent (12%) per annum, simple interest, from 
January 31, 1990, (the date of the prior judgment) 
until paid in full. 
(c) On the Fifth Claim for Relief of plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint for the following amounts: 
Principal $33,926.00 
Accrued interest through 
4/1/91 23.755,79 
TOTAL $57,682.78 
Interest shall accrue on the total combined 
amount of principal and accrued interest of $57,682. 78 
from the date of this Judgment at the rate of twelve 
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percent (12%) per annum, simple interest, until paid 
in full. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against defendants 
Franz C. Stangl, III, and Price K. M. , jointly and severally, on 
the Eighth Claim for Relief of plaintiff s Amended Complaint for 
the amounts set forth in Paragraph 1, above, including the 
amounts awarded under the First, Second, and Fifth Claims for 
Relief. 
3. The liability of defendants Franz C. Stangl, III, 
Priceview Ltd., and Price K. M. for the judgment amounts on the 
First and Second Claims for Relief of plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint, as set forth above in Paragraphs 1(a) and (b), is 
joint and several with the liability of defendant Franz C. 
Stangl, III, under the Partial Summary Judgment and Order and 
Decree of Foreclosure, filed January 31, 1990. Satisfaction of 
one such liability shall constitute satisfaction of the other. 
4. Judgment is awarded against defendants Priceview 
Ltd., Price K. M. , and Franz C. Srangl, III, jointly and 
severally, for plaintiff s attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$88,129.60 and costs in the amount of $572.40. 
5. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE 
AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
EXPENDED IN COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE 
AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
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DATED this / ^ day of^^^fl991. 
BY THE COURT: 
g: \wpl\0SS\OOO00upS. WSI 
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Srsiers'i J i^c-enl Z-isteA 
CERTIFICATE QT SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Judgment to be hand-delivered this 
\ ( day of April, 1991, to the following: 
George A. Hunt 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 2nd South, Suite 500 




VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
p. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, ) 
as trustees of UTAH STATE ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
RETIREMENT FUND, a common ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Trust fund, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) Civil No. 15620 
PRICEVIEW LTD., a Utah ) 
limited partnership; ) 
PRICE K. M. , a Utah limited ) 
partnership; FRANZ C. ) 
STANGL, III; ELIZABETH ANN ) 
STANGL; and JOHN DOES 1 ) 
through 20, ) 
Defendants. ) 
The above-captioned action came on -for trial before 
the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, of the above-entitled Court, on 
January 30, 1991. The Court previously entered Memorandum 
Decision on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
October 19, 198 9. On January 31, 1990, the Court entered its 
Partial Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure. 
At the trial of this action, plaintiff was represented by R. 
Stephen Marshall, of the law firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall 
& McCarthy. Defendants were represented by George A. Hunt and 
Kurt M. Frankenburg, of the law firm of Snow, Christensen & 
g \wpl\083\00000up8.W5i 
Martineau. The parties called witnesses and introduced 
exhibits. Following the trial the parties each submitted post-
trial memoranda. Having considered its previous rulings 
together with the evidence presented at trial and the arguments 
of counsel, and good cause appearing, the Court does hereby 
enter its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Pursuant to the Court' s Partial Summary Judgment 
and Order and Decree of Foreclosure, filed January 31, 1990, th€ 
subject property was sold by the Sheriff of Carbon County at a 
public auction on March 12, 1990, for the sum of $3,500,000.00. 
Plaintiff also received from the receiver the sum of $60,000.00 
on January 22, 1990, and the sum of $203,400.00 as of March 12, 
1990, which were applied against the Partial Summary Judgment 
and Order and Decree of Foreclosure. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a Limited 
Partnership Agreement (Exhibit P-4), under which defendant Price 
K. M. was the sole general partner and plaintiff was the sole 
limited partner. Paragraph 7 of the Limited Partnership 
Agreement between plaintiff and defendant Priceview Ltd. 
provided that plaintiff was to receive a percentage of the net 
cash receipts. 
3. Priceview Ltd. failed to pay to plaintiff the sun 
of $24,767.00 due under that provision of the Limited 
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Partnership Agreement for the year 1983, and the sum of 
$9,159.00 due for the year 1984. 
4. Defendant Stangl, on behalf of Priceview Ltd. , 
admitted at trial that the payments due under the Limited 
Partnership Agreement were not made, but contended that the 
money was used for the mutual benefit of the partnership. This 
fact would not relieve the partnership from the contractual 
obligations as stated in the Limited Partnership Agreement. 
5. At all relevant times, defendant Price K. M. , a 
Utah limited partnership, was the sole general partner of 
Priceview Ltd. 
6. At all relevant times, defendant Franz C. Stangl 
III, was the sole general partner of Price K.M. 
7. Defendants contended that plaintiff breached its 
duty of care as a lender and interfered with their operation of 
the shopping center to the extent that defendants were unable t 
properly manage the property, and that this prevented them fron 
making the payments on the promissory notes and further 
prevented them from disposing the property in order to pay off 
the notes in full. 
8. Defendants failed to introduce any evidence to 
substantiate these claims. No evidence was presented to show 
that the actions of the plaintiff in any way impaired the valu 
of the pledged property, diminished the income, or prevented t 
g \wpl\088\00000up8 W51 
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leasing or negotiation for leases on any of the pledged 
property. 
9. Much of defendants' case centered on plaintiff s 
alleged failure to cooperate in the sale of the shopping center 
together with other property in which the plaintiff had a legal 
interest. Defendants failed to meet their burden, of proving 
that plaintiff breached any duty to defendants to cooperate wit 
defendants in their efforts to sell the shopping center. 
10. The Court finds that plaintiff s counsel 
performed legal services as described in the testimony of 
plaintiff's counsel and in plaintiff's legal bills. (Exhibit P 
3. ) The Court finds that all of the work performed by 
plaintiff s counsel was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter. The Court finds that the billing rates 
charged by plaintiff s counsel were consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services. 
11. Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds 
that plaintiff s reasonable attorneys' fee for legal services 
rendered by its counsel in this action through the trial is 
$88, 129.60. The Court finds that this fee is reasonable under 
the circumstances of this case. Although defendants questioned 
the reasonableness of some of the charges made by plaintiff, 
defendants presented no affirmative evidence to dispute 
plaintiff s evidence. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against 
Priceview Ltd. on the Fifth Claim for Relief of plaintiff s 
Amended Complaint for breach of the Limited Partnership 
Agreement in the total amount of $33,926.00, together with 
interest thereon at the rate of ten percent per annum in the 
total amount of $23,794.00 as of April 1, 1991. 
3. The fact that the net cash receipts may have bee: 
used for the benefit of Priceview Ltd. does not relieve the 
partnership from its obligation to pay such sums to plaintiff 
pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Limited Partnership Agreement. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to a deficiency judgment 
against defendant Priceview Ltd. on the First and Second Claims 
for Relief of plaintiff's Amended Complaint in the amounts 
previously found to be due and owing by the Court in the Partia] 
Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure, filed 
January 31, 1990, less the amount for which the subject property 
was sold at the Sheriff's sale of March 12, 1990, and the 
amounts paid to plaintiff by the receiver. 
5. Defendant Priceview Ltd. is liable to plaintiff 
for plaintiff's attorneys' fees in the amount of $88,129.60 and 
for costs in the amount of $572.40. 
-5-
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6. Defendant Price K. M. , as general partner of 
Priceview Ltd. and defendant Franz C. Stangl/ III/ as general 
partner of Price K. M. , are jointly and severally liable to 
plaintiff on the Eighth Claim for Relief of plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint for all amounts for which Priceview Ltd. is liable to 
plaintiff, including the amounts described in paragraphs 2, 4, 
i 
and 5, above, pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-9 (1989), and the 
Utah Uniform Partnership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-12 (1989). 
7. Defendants did not meet their burden of proving 
any of their affirmative defenses. 
8. Plaintiff was under no legal duty or obligation 
to give up its individually held assets, namely the neighboring 
K-Mart, in order to facilitate defendants' sale of the shopping 
center. The Court can find no breach of duty on the part of 
plaintiff to cooperate in defendants' efforts to sell the 
shopping center. 
DATED this day of April, 1991. 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law to be hand-delivered this day of April, 1991, to the 
following: 
George A. Hunt 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 2nd South, Suite 500 
P. 0. Box 45678 
(Zfrfyvtuw b U o ^ / U , u 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
as Trustees of UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT FUND, a common 
trust fund, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRICEVIEW LTD., a Utah limited
 t 
partnership; PRICE K.M., a Utah
 t 
limited partnership; FRANZ C. ] 
STANGL, III; individually and ] 
as Personal Representative of ] 
the Estate of ELIZABETH ANN ] 
STANGL; and JOHN DOES 1 ] 
through 20, ] 
Defendants. ] 
I MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i ON TRIAL MATTERS 
, Civil No. 15620 
This case came on regularly for trial before the 
Court on January 30, 1991, and the Court heard testimony and 
received exhibits relative to the issues to be * determined by 
the Court at that time. The Court took the matter under 
advisement and rules as here and after stated. 
The Court has already made findings on the execution 
of the various documents, the default in the payments as 
required under those docments, and the establishment of 
amounts due from defendants to plaintiff, and other related 
matters. At this trial, .one of the issues tried by the Court 
EXHIBIT NO. J i _ 
was whether Priceview breached the limited partnership 
agreement and, if so, what amount is owing to the plaintiff 
as a result of the breach. 
The Court finds that the limited partnership 
agreement between plaintiff and Priceview Ltd. provided that 
the plaintiff was to receive a percentage of the net cash 
receipts, and those provisions were covered in Section 7 of 
the agreement. The Court further finds that Priceview failed 
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $24,767.00 due under said 
provision for the year 1933, and the sum of $9,159.00 for the 
year 1984. 
The defendant Stangl, on behalf of Priceview, admits 
that the payments were not made but contends that the money 
was used for the mutual benefit of the Partnership. This 
fact would not relieve the Partnership from the contractual 
obligations as stated in the partnership agreement. 
The Court has concluded that the plaintiff is 
entitled to judgment for the amounts due, together with 
interest at the highest legal rate, against the defendant 
Priceview in accordance with the executed agreement. 
The Court further finds that Price K.M., as a 
general partnership of Priceview, and F.C. Stangle, III, as a 
general partner of Price K.M., under the provisions of the 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the provisions of the 
Uniform Partnership Act, are obligated to pay these amounts 
to the plaintiff. 
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The Court therefore authorizes entry of judgment for 
these amounts in favor of the plaintiff and against these 
defendants. 
A second issue tried by the Court was whether the 
plaintiff engaged in conduct that impaired the value of the 
collateral sufficiently to relieve defendants from 
responsibility for payment of a deficiency judgment. 
It is the contention of the defendants that the 
plaintiff breached its duty of care as a lender, and 
interfered with their operation of the shopping center to the 
extent that defendants were unable to properly manage the 
property, and that this prevented them from making the 
payments on the promissory notes and further prevented them 
from disposing of the property in order to pay off the notes 
in full. 
The defendants have failed to introduce any evidence 
to substantiate this claim. No evidence was presented to 
show that the actions of the plaintiff in any way impaired 
the value of the pledged property, or diminished the income, 
or prevented the leasing or negotiation for leases on any of 
the pledged property. 
Much of the defendant's case centered on plaintiff's 
failure to cooperate in the sale of the shopping center, 
together with other property in which the plaintiff had a 
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legal interest. The plaintiff was under no legal duty or 
obligation to give up its individually held assets in order 
to accomplish a sale as proposed by defendants. The Court 
can find no breach of duty on the part of the plaintiff to 
cooperate in defendant's efforts to sell the shopping center. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiff is 
entitled to a deficiency judgment in accordance with the 
amounts previously found to be due and owing by the Court. 
Judgment may be taken for these deficiency amounts against 
Priceview Limited and Price K.M., and against F.C. Stangl, 
III, in accordance with partnership law as stated above. 
The Court finds that the loan documents and the 
limited partnership documents both provide for payment cf a 
reasonable attorney's fee to plaintiff upon breach of those 
agreements by the defendants. The Court further finds that 
there has been a breach of the defendant's duties under those 
documents, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a 
reasonable attorney's fee and their costs in this proceeding. 
The only evidence submitted relative to the amount 
of a reasonable attorney's fee was presented by plaintiff. 
The defendants questioned the reasonableness of some of the 
charges made by the plaintiff, but presented no affirmitive 
evidence to dispute those contentions. 
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Based upon the evidence before the Court, which the 
Court will not herein detail, the Court finds that a 
reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded to the plaintiff for 
this action and the foreclosure proceedings is the sum of 
$88,129.60, and plaintiff is.granted judgment against 
Priceview Ltd., Price K.M., and F. C. Stangl, III, in 
accordance with Partnership Lav;. Judgment is further granted 
for these amounts against F.C. Stangl, III, and against him 
as personal representative of the estate of Elizabeth Ann 
Stangl, deceased, based upon their unconditional guarantees. 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to prepare 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree in 
accordance with this decision. 
DATED this / ^ day of March, 1991. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ON TRIAL 
MATTERS by depositing the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Alan L. Sullivan 
R. Stephen Marshall 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City UT 8414*5 
George A, Hunt 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 




49*9-11. Retirement board to control investment of funds — Board 
to appoint custodian of funds — Fees. The retirement board shall have 
the control of the investment of any and all funds assigned to the retire-
ment board or retirement office for investment The board shall determine 
the method of investing the funds to insure the greatest return commensu-
rate with sound financing adequately safeguarded. The board may invest 
and reinvest the money in the retirement fund or funds and may provide 
for the holding, purchasing, selling, assigning, transferring and disposing 
of any of the securities and investments in which any of the money of the 
fund or funds is invested. The board shall appoint a custodian for the funds 
and securities under its control. Fees for such services shall be paid from 
the interest earnings of the investment fund. 
History: L 1963. ch. 74. § 11:1965, ch. 86. The 1980 amendment substituted the last 
§ 1; 1971. ch. 109. § 3; 1980. ch. 47. § 1. two sentences for a sentence which read-
Compiler's Notes. MThe s u t e : ™ " r e r shall serve without 
The 1965 amendment substituted "invest- **** M cu$lodian of ^ fufld or iun^ 
ment" for '•administration" in two piaces in pjra-tsv# D*t*. 
the nrst sentence. Mecnve u i u . 
The 1971 amendment substituted "insure" Section 2 of Laws 1980, ch. 47 provided: 
for "ensure" in the second sentence. "This act snail take effect July 1.1980." 
49-9-12. Investment of funds — Unrated securities — Investments 
not subject to control of board. (1) The retirement board may invest 
any and all funds assigned to it as set forth as follows: 
(a) Bonds or other evidences of indebtedness of the United States or 
any of its agencies or instrumentalities when such obligations are guaran-
teed as to principal and interest by the United States. 
(b) General obligation bonds or other evidence of indebtedness of any 
state, or of any county, incorporated city, town or school district of the 
state or territory of the United States, provided said bonds are at the time 
of purchase rated within the three highest classifications established by 
at least one standard rating service. 
(c) Bonds, notes or evidence of indebtedness of any county, municipal-
ity, or municipal district utility within the United States, which are pay-
able from revenues or earnings specifically pledged for the payment of the 
principal and interest on such obligations, provided that said revenue 
bonds are at the time of purchase rated within the three highest classifica-
tions established by at least one standard rating service. 
(d) Bonds, debentures or other evidences of indebtedness issued, 
assumed or guaranteed by any solvent corporation or institution created 
or existing under the laws of the United States or of any state, district 
or territory thereof, which are not in default as to principal or interest, 
provided that said bonds at the time of purchase are rated within the three 
highest classifications established by at least one standard rating service. 
(e) Equipment trust obligations or certificates secured by an interest 
in transportation equipment whoDy or in part within the United States 
which carry the right to receive determined portions of rental, purchase 
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ioard or fixed obligatory payments to be made for the use or purchase (or fixed 
have obligatory payments to be made for the use or purchase) of such transpor-
etire- tation equipment, provided that said obligations are at the time of pur-
-mine chase rated within the three highest classifications established by at least 
ensu- one standard rating service. 
nvest (f) Securities of any open-end or closed-end management type invest-
•ovide ment company or investment trust, participation in common trust funds 
iosing or shares, preferred or guaranteed stock, and nonassessable common stock 
)f the o: shares of any solvent corporation or institution created or existing 
funds uncer the laws of the United States or any state, district or territory 
from thereof, provided that said stocks are at the time of purchase rated within 
the three highest classifications established by at least one standard rating 
ne last service. 
•eao: (g) Obligations issued or unconditionally guaranteed by international 
^
i:!?ou: development lending institutions of which the United States is a member 
and *.vhose obligations are qualified for investment by national banks. 
(h) Real estate mortgages secured by Federal Housing Administration 
?vldeQ: iFHA) or Veterans Administration (VA) insurance or guaranteed commit-
ments or notes secured by mortgages or trust deeds on real estate which 
aents are guaranteed as to payment of interest and principal by a corporation, 
nvest approved by the state commissioner of insurance, which is licensed to do 
business in the state of Utah as an insurer and which has assets of $50 
es or million or more and that the corporation insurance exposure at the time 
aran- oi note purchase is limited to not more than 25 times the value of capital, 
surplus and contingency reserves. 
f any (i) Saving deposit or certificate of deposit of a bank insured by the Fed-
•f the erai Deposit Insurance Corporation, or :o the extent that they are insured 
time ir* shares or accounts of either state chartered or federal chartered savings 
ad by and loan and building and loan associations which are insured by the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. 
cipal- fj) The interest in or portion of notes, obligations or other written evi-
pay- dence of indebtedness used as collateral for loans and which are guaran-
}f the teed by any authorized agency of the United States government as to 
venue payment of principal, interest or rents. 
sinca- (k) Bonds or other evidence of indebtedness issued or guaranteed by an 
agency or instrumentality of the United States, including, but not limited 
;sued, to, the guaranteed portion of loans guaranteed by any such agency or 
eated instrumentality. 
strict (1) Unrated securities which would otherwise qualify for purchase by 
erest, the board under subsections (1) (b), (c), id), (e) or (f) of this section, where 




 securities rated within the three highest classifications as required of 
merest rated securities. 
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" &e book value of the investment portfolio. Buildings may be purchased 
125 
49-9-13 PENSIONS 
or land acquired and new buildings constructed. At least two certified 
appraisals are required for purposes of determining portfolio market val-
ues. 
(2) Investments shall not be subject to the control of the board of 
examiners. 
History: L 1963. ch. 74. § 12:1965. ch. S6f 
§ 1:1973. ch. 98. § 3:1975, ch. 91, § 3:1975, ch. 
148, § 1; 1979. ch. 172. § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1965 amendment added "or as set 
forth as follows" to the first sentence; and 
inserted subds. (a; through (i) and present 
subd. il). 
The 1973 amendment deleted "in accord-
ance with investments approved for invest-
ment ox the Utah School Employees Retire-
men: Funds, or Utah Public Employees' 
Retirement Funds or" after "assignee to it" 
in the nrst sentence; added "or note secured m 
" " contingency reserves" at the end oi subd. 
(h); inserted suod. (j); and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and 
style. 
The 1975 amendment by chapter 91 
inserted the subsection designations tl) and 
(2); deleted "or by any agency or instrumen-
tality thereof, including obligations of the 
federal ianc banks, federal intermediate 
credit banks, federal home owned banks. fed-
History: L 1963. ch. 74. § 13; 1965. ch. $6. 
§ 1; 1969. cr.. 124. § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1965 amendment rewrote this section 
which previously provided for payment and 
proration of administrative expenses by the 
board, assessment of members of re::rement 
systems without funds, and approval of the 
administrative budget of the retirement 
orlce. 
The 1969 amendment substituted "and the 
legislature for their examination and 
approval" in the second sentence for "for his 
renew and approval and thereafter may be 
expended as herein provided*'; and deleted a 
sentence providing for adjustment of the 
eraJ national mortgage associations, fanners 
home administration notes, and banks for 
co-operatives" from the end of subd. (l)(a); 
substituted "international development lend-
ing institutions of which the United States is 
a member and whose obligations are quali-
fied for investment by national banks'* in 
subd. ilHgj for ^International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, or the 
Inter-American Development Bank"; inserted 
suod. ilHk;; inserted designation of subd. 
(1X1); and made minor changes in phraseoi-
0©'. 
The 1975 amendment by chaoter 148 
inserted subd. (l)(m); and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
The 1979 amendment substituted **15^M 
for "1 4 V in the first sentence of subd. 
(Dim;; and substituted "market values" for 
"limitations" in the third sentence of subd. 
(lXmi. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1979, ch. 172 provided* 
"This act shall take etfect July 1,1979." 
budget in the event of new or unanticipated 
programs. 
The bracketed word was inserted by the 
compiler. 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 2 of Laws 1969. ch. 124 provided; 
"Section 49-10-54. Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
as enacted by chapter 106, Laws of Utah 
1957, is hereby repealed." 
Effective Dates. 
Section 2 of Laws 1965, ch. 86 provided 
that the act should take effect upon approval. 
Approved March 18.1965. 
Section 3 of Laws 1969, ch. 124 provided 
"This act shall take effect on July 1.1969." 
49-9-13. Budget. The director shall prepare an annual adminisrrative 
budge: covering the anticipated administrative costs of [the] Utah state 
retirement office for the forthcoming fiscal year and present the same to 
the Utah state retirement board for its examination and approval. Upon 
approval by the board the budget shall be submitted to the governor and 
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UTAH STATE RETIREMENT OFFICE 49-9-12 -
e director — Removal — 
Responsibilities — Em-
cecutive director to administer 
removal by the board for cause, 
are as follows: 
the retirement board and the 
'Stems, and functions assigned 
e approval of the board admin-
thority granted by the respec-
-ious retirement statutes: 
rd any appeals received from 
t the retirement office, or any 
of the director, and to arrange 
i party or parries: 
\ Legislature, and its agencies, 
and groups informed on the 
t Office, including the opera-
nd programs administered by 
islative changes deemed nec-
ltes: 
: legislation or proposed iegis-
al administrative budget cov-
Retirement Office and upon 
lent expenditures of the bud-
f the budget staff personnel 
ment systems and funds as-
may include actuaries, attor-
xmselors. accountants, and 
>h the purpose of the retire-
1
 shall be established bv the 
of the introductory paragraph to 
ingle sentence, suDsmuting "who 
'He snail", deleted "set forth" 
follows" in the second sentence of 
the introductory paragraph; deleted "to ad-
minister" it the end of Subsection (2); deleted 
"and regulations as are deemed necessary or 
desirable, and" after "rules" in Subsection 
(3); substituted "of the budget" for "thereoT 
in Subsection (8); deleted "as is deemed nec-
essary" after "consultants" and "for adminis-
tration" after "office" in the first sentence of 
Subsection (9); deleted "as may be necessary" 
after "assistants" in the second sentence of 
Subsection (9); added "and shall not be sub-
ject to Section 67-6-3" at the end of Subsec-
tion (9); and made minor changes in phrase-
ology and punctuation. 
Right to appoint attorneys. 
The attorney general does not have exclu-
sive constitutional authority to act as legal 
adviser to the state retirement board; there-
fore, the provision of this section authorizing 
the appointment of attorneys does not violate 
Art. VII, § 16 of the state constitution; fur-
thermore, this section provides an exception 
to the general authority of the attorney gen-
eral to perform legal services for any agency 
of state government. Hansen v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd. (1982) 652 P 2d 1332. 
49-9-12, Investment of funds — Unrated securities — In-
vestments not subject to control of board. 
(1) The retirement board may invest, subject to the standard of a prudent 
man dealing with the property of another, any and all funds assigned to it 
as set forth as follows: 
(a) Bonds or other evidences of indebtedness of the United States or 
any of its agencies or instrumentalities when such obligations are 
guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States. 
(b) General obligation bonds or other evidence of indebtedness of 
any state, or of any county, incorporated city, town or school district of 
the state or territory of the United States, provided said bonds are at 
the time of purchase rated within the three highest classifications es-
tablished by at least one standard rating service. 
(c) Bonds, notes or evidence of indebtedness of any county, munici-
pality, or municipal district utility within the United States, which are 
payable from revenues or earnings specifically pledged for the payment 
of the principal and interest on such obligations, provided that said 
revenue bonds are at the time of purchase rated within the three high-
est classifications established by at least one standard rating service. 
(d) Bonds, debentures or other evidences of indebtedness issued, as-
sumed or guaranteed by any solvent corporation or institution created 
or existing under the laws of the United States or of any state, district 
or territory thereof, which are not in default as to principal or interest, 
provided that said bonds at the time of purchase are rated within the 
three highest classifications established by at least one standard rating 
service. 
(e) Equipment trust obligations or certificates secured by an interest 
in transportation equipment wholly or in part within the United States 
which carry the right to receive determined portions of rental, pur-
chase or fixed obligatory payments to be made for the use or purchase 
(or fixed obligatory payments to be made for the use or purchase) of 
such transportation equipment, provided that said obligations are at 
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the time of purchase rated within the three highest classifications es-
tablished by at least one standard rating service. 
(f) Securities of any open-end or closed-end management type invest-
ment company or investment trust, participation in common trust 
funds or shares, preferred or guaranteed stock, and nonassessable com-
mon stock or shares of any solvent corporation or institution created or 
existing under the laws of the United States or any state, district or 
territory thereof, provided that said stocks are at the time of purchase 
rated within the three highest classifications established by at least 
one standard rating service. 
(g) Obligations issued or unconditionally guaranteed by interna-
tional development lending institutions of which the United States is a 
member and whose obligations are qualified for investment by na-
tional banks 
(h) Real estate mortgages secured by Federal Housing Administra-
tion (FHA) or Veterans Administration (VA) insurance or guaranteed 
commitments or notes secured by mortgages or trust deeds on real 
estate which are guaranteed as to payment of interest and pnncipal by 
a corporation, approved by the state commissioner of insurance, which 
is licensed to do business in the state of Utah as an insurer and which 
has assets of S50 million or more and that the corporation insurance 
exposure at the time of note purchase is limited to not more than 25 
times the value of capital, surplus and contingency reserves. 
i) Saving deposit or certificate of deposit of a bank insured by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or to the extent that they are 
insured m shares or accounts of either state chartered or federal char-
tered savings and loan and building and loan associations which are 
insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. 
(j) The interest in or portion of notes, obligations or other written 
evidence of mdeotedness used as collateral for loans and which are 
guaranteed by any authorized agency of the United States government 
as to payment of principal, interest or rents 
<k) Bonds or other evidence of indebtedness issued or guaranteed by 
an agency or instrumentality of the United States, including, but not 
limited to, the guaranteed portion of loans guaranteed by any such 
agency or instrumentality 
(1) Unrated securities which would otherwise qualify for purchase by 
the board under subsections (1Mb), (c), id), te) or (f) of this section, 
where such unrated securities are found by the board to be of a quality 
equal to securities rated within the three highest classifications as 
required of rated securities. 
(m) Real estate for the production of income and use not to exceed 
15% of the book value of the investment portfolio. Buildings may be 
purchased or land acquired and new buildings constructed. At least 
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two certified appraisals are required for purposes of determining port-
folio market values. 
(n) Any other investment in which a prudent man dealing with th* 
property of another would invest. 
(2) Investments shall not be subject to tne control 01 me Doard ol exam-
iners. 
History: I~ 1963, ch. 74, i 12; 1965, ch. Compiler1* Notes. — The 1983 amend-
86, 8 1; 1973, ch. 98, 5 3; 1975, ch. 91, § 3; ment inserted "subject to the standard of a 
11T75, ch. 148, § 1; 1979, ch. 172, § 1; 1983, prudent man dealing with the property of an-
ch. 217, i 1. other" in subsec. (1); and added subsec. (lMn). 
49-9-14. Life, health, and medical insurance benefits — 
Definitions — Duties of State Retirement Office 
— Funds — Report 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a mechanism whereby the state 
of Utah and its political subdivisions may provide their employees group 
health, medical, disability, and life insurance in the most economical and 
efficient manner. The Legislature intends that beginning July 16,1977, the 
state employees' group health and medical insurance shall be established 
on a self-funded and actuarially sound basis. 
The board may assist active and retired members and beneficiaries and 
inactive members of the various retirement systems administered under its 
direction, to purchase life, health, and medical insurance on a group basis 
which can be continued after retirement under such rules as the board may 
adopt. The director may employ any personnel, including consultants, as 
may be needed to carry out the "provisions of this section. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Employee'* means any employee of any department, agency, 
division, institution of the state of Utah, and its political subdivi-
sions. 
lb) "Employer" means the state of Utah, its departments, agen-
cies, divisions, and political subdivisions. 
(c) "Employee group benefit plans" means any group health, 
medical, disability, or life insurance program administered by the 
Utah State Retirement Board and approved by the Legislature for 
employees of the state of Utah and its political subdivisions. 
(2) The State Retirement Office is charged with the following duties 
and responsibilities: 
(a) to act as a self-insurer of employee group benefit plans, ad-
minister those plans, enter into contracts with private insurers to 
underwrite employee group benefit plans, and to reinsure those 
portions of self-insured plans as considered appropriate; 
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78*37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Spe-
cial execution. 
78-37-2. Deficiency judgment — Execution-
78-37-3. Necessary parties — Unrecorded 
rights barred. 
78-37-4. Sales — Disposition of surplus 
moneys. 
78-37-5. Sales — When debt due in install-
ments. 
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution. 
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of 
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given ad-
judgmg the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of mort-
gaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing 
costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the 
provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or 
order of saie snail be issued for that purpose. 
History L. 1951, ch. 58. § 1; C. 1943, ceedmgs supplemental thereto. Rule 69, 
Supp- 104-37-1; L. 1965. ch. 172, § 1. UiLCP. 
Cross-References. — Execution and pro- Trust deeds, § 57-1-19 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action for deficiency 
AppucaoiLty of 5ecvxn 
Defenses 
Exclusive reaecv 
Exnausuon of security 
Legislative intent. 
Lumtacon to singae su.: 
Nature oi action. 
Pleacmg 
Sues. 
Seme* of process. 
Action for deficiency. 
Former statute he id not bar to action at la* 
for deficiency remaining after sale under 
power is trust deed failed to realize full 
amount of note secured bv suon deed. Mailory 
•. Kesaler, 18 Utah 11,54 P. 892.72 Am. St R. 
765 (1898). 
Applicability of section. 
Pledge was not mortgage within meaning of 
former § 104-55- L Campbell v. Peter, 108 
Utah 565, 162 P.2d 754 '1945 
552 
EXHIBIT NO. J L 
Section 
78-37-6. Right of redemption — Sales by par-
cels—Of land and water stock. 
78-37-7. Repealed. 
78-37-8. Restraining possessor from injuring 
property. 
78-37-9. Attorney fees. 
Hie rights of a creditor secured by a p « v 
of personal property are governed by the Urn 
form Commercial Code, not this secaoou KJ 
neoy T. Bank of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881 (Ut 
1979). 
This section applies only to actions betwi 
mortgagors and mortgagees and was not L^r 
cable in a suit by mortgagee for an ifflff«tt . 
against the purcnaser of mortgaged personalty^ 
Pillsbury Miiis v, Nephi Processing Plan*. ^ 
Utah 2d 286, 323 P2d t>c* "«*** 
